RIBADU WARNS GUNS ALONE WILL NOT END BANDITRY AS ARMED GROUPS EXPAND INTO TERRITORIAL CONTROL, ILLEGAL TAXATION AND CROSS BORDER CRIME

Nigeria’s National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu has warned that military operations alone will not be enough to defeat banditry, arguing that the security crisis has evolved from cattle rustling, highway robbery and kidnapping into a far more complex threat involving territorial control, illegal taxation of rural communities, illicit arms networks and disruption of agriculture, trade and education. Ribadu said the Federal Government must combine force with intelligence led operations, tighter border management, community trust building, regional cooperation and measures designed to prevent vulnerable young people from being recruited into criminal networks. His remarks came during a security brainstorming session in Sokoto, one of the states most affected by the expansion of armed groups across Nigeria’s North West, where residents in some rural areas have reported years of displacement, repeated kidnappings and pressure from criminal groups attempting to impose their own authority over communities.

Ribadu delivered the message through Zakari Mijinyawa, Director of Legal Services in the Office of the National Security Adviser, at a forum organised by the Sokoto Advancement Forum in collaboration with the Centre for Peace Studies at Usmanu Danfodiyo University. The gathering brought together security officials, academics, community leaders and civil society figures to examine how banditry can be contained and how communities already damaged by years of attacks can be stabilised. Ribadu’s central argument was that military success must remain part of the response but cannot by itself eliminate the conditions that allow armed groups to survive, recruit, move weapons across borders and rebuild after security forces clear particular areas.

The National Security Adviser said Sokoto’s proximity to Niger Republic and the wider Sahel gives the crisis an important international dimension. Armed groups can exploit remote border terrain, gaps in surveillance and illicit trafficking routes to move people, weapons and supplies across national boundaries. For that reason, Ribadu said Nigeria’s response must include stronger border management and greater regional intelligence cooperation rather than treating every violent incident as a purely local criminal problem. Sokoto’s position near a region already affected by extremist violence, weapons trafficking and weak state control in parts of the Sahel means that instability beyond Nigeria’s borders can affect what happens inside rural communities in the state.

Ribadu said intelligence must become one of the strongest tools in the counter banditry campaign. Security forces can destroy camps and arrest fighters, but they depend heavily on information about where armed groups are operating, who is supplying them, how they are moving and which communities are at risk. He argued that communities are more likely to share intelligence when they trust security agencies to act on the information and protect the identities of people who come forward. That trust has become particularly important in areas where residents fear retaliation from armed groups or believe criminals may have local informants capable of identifying people who cooperate with government forces.

The NSA specifically identified Sabon Birni, Isa, Tangaza and Goronyo as places where early warning systems should be strengthened so that suspicious movements and emerging threats can be reported quickly enough for security agencies to respond before attacks occur. The emphasis on early warning reflects one of the major criticisms of counter banditry operations in the North West. Security forces have sometimes succeeded in rescuing abducted residents or pursuing attackers after raids, but repeated incidents have raised the harder question of whether enough attacks are being prevented before villagers are killed, kidnapped or forced to flee.

That challenge has been visible in recent Sokoto incidents. Police confirmed an attack on communities in Shagari Local Government Area earlier this month after residents raised alarms about armed men moving through nearby farmland. In another October operation, police said security forces repelled bandits who attacked Tsabre village in Isa Local Government Area and recovered weapons including two rocket launchers abandoned by the attackers. The incidents demonstrate both sides of the current security picture. Nigerian forces are capable of repelling attacks and recovering weapons, but armed groups remain able to approach communities with significant firepower.

Ribadu said the nature of banditry itself has changed substantially. What was once widely described as a criminal economy centred on cattle theft, armed robbery and kidnapping has developed in some locations into something closer to parallel governance imposed through violence. Armed groups have been accused of collecting illegal levies from farmers, controlling access to farmland and threatening communities that refuse to pay. In other places, residents have reported that armed leaders influence who can farm, trade or travel. These forms of control are especially damaging because they weaken state authority even where militants do not permanently occupy towns or openly administer territory.

The issue of illegal taxation has become one of the clearest signs of that transformation. Rural residents in parts of the North West have described being forced to pay levies before they can plant crops, harvest fields or move livestock safely. The payments effectively create a criminal taxation system in which armed groups profit directly from the economic activity of the communities they terrorise. Premium Times has documented allegations from affected residents in Sokoto and neighboring states describing such pressure, although responsibility can vary between different armed groups and individual claims are not always independently verifiable.

This form of coercion can survive even when large military camps are disrupted because criminal groups do not always need to hold territory in the conventional sense. Fear alone can create control. If farmers believe they will be kidnapped or killed unless they pay a levy, the armed group can extract money without maintaining a visible permanent presence. That is one reason Ribadu’s emphasis on intelligence and local confidence is significant. Destroying a camp does not necessarily destroy the network of informants, suppliers, financiers and local collaborators that allows a group to continue operating.

The government is also increasingly focused on weapons supply. Ribadu said authorities must sustain action against illicit arms and logistical networks supporting bandits. Separate reporting from the same Sokoto security dialogue said the Federal Government has destroyed more than 19,000 illicit weapons since 2022 as part of wider efforts to reduce access to firearms by criminal and terrorist groups. The NSA also highlighted the need for stronger coordination under the National Crisis Management Doctrine, a framework intended to reduce fragmentation between agencies and improve cooperation during major security threats.

The scale of illicit weapons circulation remains a major concern because firearms allow what might otherwise be relatively small criminal networks to exercise enormous power over rural communities. Motorcycles give fighters mobility across difficult terrain, while rifles and heavier weapons can allow them to attack villages quickly and withdraw before reinforcements arrive. Recent police recovery of rocket launchers in Sokoto has further illustrated concerns about the sophistication of weapons reaching armed groups, although possession of such weapons does not by itself establish that all bandit networks have comparable capabilities.

Ribadu’s strategy therefore combines military pressure with attempts to dismantle the support systems that make armed violence sustainable. He outlined five broad priority areas for Sokoto. These include denying criminal groups safe havens, improving intelligence and early warning, rebuilding trust between communities and authorities, protecting agriculture and rural livelihoods and stopping young people from being drawn into armed networks. The government’s position is that security becomes more durable when communities can resume normal economic and social activity rather than simply experiencing a temporary reduction in attacks.

Agriculture is central to that approach because insecurity in rural Nigeria has become an economic problem as well as a security problem. Farmers who cannot safely reach their land produce less food. Families displaced from villages lose crops, livestock and income. Traders avoid dangerous roads and markets, increasing transportation costs and disrupting supply chains. When enough farming communities are affected, the consequences can contribute to food shortages and higher prices well beyond the areas where attacks are occurring.

Ribadu warned that persistent violence is already damaging farming and commerce while interrupting children’s education. When villages are abandoned, schools close and teachers leave. When roads become unsafe, businesses lose customers and goods cannot move freely. When farmers fear kidnapping, agricultural land can remain unused even during planting seasons. These effects make banditry self reinforcing because economic collapse can increase the number of unemployed or marginalised young people vulnerable to recruitment by the same criminal networks responsible for the insecurity.

That connection explains why Ribadu placed youth recruitment among the five priorities. He called for socio economic measures that reduce the vulnerability of young people to recruitment while supporting lawful rehabilitation programmes for individuals who genuinely abandon violence. He also drew a clear limit around such programmes, warning that reintegration must not become a substitute for justice or a system that appears to reward people for committing violent crimes.

The question of rehabilitation has long been controversial in Nigeria because communities that have suffered killings, abductions and extortion can see reintegration programmes as unfair if former fighters appear to receive assistance while victims receive little support. Ribadu’s position attempts to preserve a distinction between people who can be lawfully rehabilitated and individuals who must still face accountability for serious offences. The government’s broader challenge is designing programmes that encourage defections from armed groups without creating incentives for violence or undermining public confidence in justice.

Community trust is equally difficult. In areas where residents have experienced delayed security responses or repeated attacks, confidence in government may already be weak. Armed groups can exploit that distrust by threatening people who cooperate with authorities and portraying the state as unable to protect informants. Intelligence systems therefore depend not only on technology and surveillance but also on whether villagers believe that reporting suspicious activity will make them safer rather than expose them to retaliation.

That is why Ribadu argued that security agencies must improve the way they handle information from communities. Sensitive intelligence must be protected, and residents must see evidence that authorities respond effectively. A single compromised source can discourage an entire community from cooperating. Conversely, successful prevention of an attack after residents provide information can strengthen confidence and encourage others to participate in early warning networks.

Traditional rulers, local government officials, religious leaders and community associations can all play a role in such systems because they often understand local movements and relationships better than national agencies. The difficulty is ensuring that information is passed rapidly and securely to operational units capable of acting on it. Ribadu’s proposal for stronger early warning structures appears designed to address that gap.

The focus on Sokoto reflects the seriousness of the crisis in the state. Sokoto Advancement Forum chairman Professor Muhammad Ahmad Wali said security incidents had been recorded in 21 of the state’s 23 local government areas. He also said more than 1,100 people were reportedly kidnapped during the 12 months leading to June 2026. Those figures were presented by the forum rather than independently verified national statistics, but they illustrate the scale of concern among local stakeholders and the extent to which insecurity is no longer confined to only a small number of border communities.

Some displaced residents have been unable to return home for years. Premium Times reported that families in parts of Sokoto have remained displaced for extended periods because they fear renewed attacks, while some residents in displacement settlements have struggled with housing costs, irregular work and loss of access to farmland. Such conditions demonstrate why Ribadu said security performance cannot be measured only by the number of fighters killed, suspects arrested or weapons recovered.

For the NSA, success must also be visible in civilian life. Communities should become safe enough for displaced families to return. Farms should produce again. Schools should reopen. Markets should function normally. Roads should be usable without residents fearing kidnapping. Public confidence should recover. This broader definition of success shifts the focus from tactical operations to whether government authority and ordinary life actually return after troops leave an area.

That standard is important because security forces can clear territory temporarily without resolving the reasons armed groups were able to dominate it. If police posts remain weak, roads are unmonitored and communities still lack economic opportunities, fighters may return after military units redeploy. Sustained security therefore requires a government presence that extends beyond soldiers and includes policing, justice, local administration, education and economic activity.

Sokoto Governor Ahmed Aliyu has similarly said that security efforts should continue until internally displaced residents are able to return safely to their ancestral communities. His administration has provided vehicles and other equipment to security agencies and established the Sokoto State Community Guard Corps as part of its response to insecurity. State officials say they are trying to combine support for conventional security agencies with local surveillance and intelligence structures.

The use of local guards is itself sensitive because community security groups can provide valuable intelligence but require training, oversight and clear legal authority. Poorly regulated armed groups can create new problems if they become involved in abuses or local disputes. The challenge for Sokoto and other affected states is to use local knowledge without replacing professional security institutions with uncontrolled militias.

Border management presents another major obstacle. Nigeria’s northern frontier stretches across remote territory where communities, trade routes and family connections predate modern national borders. Closing those borders completely is neither realistic nor economically desirable. The government instead needs better surveillance, intelligence cooperation and targeted enforcement capable of identifying weapons trafficking and suspicious movements without shutting down legitimate commerce.

Regional cooperation has become more complicated because of political instability across the Sahel. Governments in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have undergone military takeovers in recent years, altering security relationships and weakening some traditional regional structures. Nigeria still needs cooperation with neighbours because armed groups do not necessarily respect political tensions between governments. Criminal networks can exploit any breakdown in coordination.

Ribadu’s comments therefore reflect a security environment in which domestic banditry increasingly overlaps with broader Sahel instability. Nigeria’s North West is not identical to the insurgency in the North East, and officials generally distinguish between different militant networks. But porous borders, illicit weapons and the possibility of cooperation between criminal and extremist groups mean those theatres cannot be treated as completely separate.

That concern is particularly visible around groups operating near the Niger border. Security forces recently reported killing a suspected Lakurawa militant in Tangaza Local Government Area after armed men attacked a resident in Soruro village. Authorities recovered an AK 47 rifle, magazine and ammunition. The incident demonstrated the complexity of the security environment in which bandits, criminal networks and militant organisations can operate in overlapping areas.

Nigeria’s security agencies have achieved tactical successes in recent years, including raids on camps, rescue of hostages and recovery of weapons. Yet recurring attacks show why Ribadu is arguing for a broader strategy. Military force can disrupt an armed group, but without intelligence, border security and functioning local governance, another network can replace it or surviving fighters can reorganise elsewhere.

The same principle applies to peace agreements negotiated at community level. In parts of Sokoto and neighbouring Katsina, local settlements with armed groups have produced periods of relative calm, but attacks have later resumed in some areas. Premium Times found that outcomes vary substantially from one community to another, with some agreements reducing violence while other locations experience renewed kidnappings and displacement.

That mixed experience helps explain Ribadu’s warning against relying on any single solution. Military operations alone are insufficient, but negotiations alone are also unlikely to resolve every conflict. Development projects cannot replace policing, while security deployments cannot substitute for functioning schools and markets. The government’s current position is that all of these tools must operate together.

Justice will also be critical. Residents who see attackers arrested and then quickly released may lose confidence in the state. Ribadu’s warning that rehabilitation must not replace justice reflects the need for a credible legal system capable of prosecuting serious offences. Faster investigation and prosecution can also weaken the culture of impunity that allows criminal leaders to operate for years.

At the same time, Nigeria’s courts and prisons already face significant capacity pressures. A large counter banditry campaign can generate hundreds or thousands of suspects, making it difficult to determine quickly who should be prosecuted, rehabilitated or released. That requires stronger evidence gathering and coordination between intelligence agencies, police and prosecutors.

The economic dimension may prove just as difficult. Creating employment opportunities in rural communities where schools, roads and businesses have been disrupted by years of insecurity is not a quick process. Investors avoid dangerous areas, while farmers cannot rebuild without confidence that they will be able to harvest what they plant. Government therefore has to improve security and development simultaneously rather than waiting for one to be completed before beginning the other.

Youth employment is especially important because armed groups can offer money, motorcycles, weapons or a sense of power to young men with few alternatives. Poverty does not automatically produce criminality, and most poor Nigerians do not join armed groups. But Ribadu’s argument is that economic vulnerability can make recruitment easier, particularly when combined with weak state presence and access to illicit weapons.

Protecting agriculture can therefore function as both an economic policy and a security policy. Farmers who can work safely generate income, feed families and strengthen local markets. Communities with functioning livelihoods are harder for armed groups to dominate through extortion. Schools that remain open also give younger people alternatives to recruitment and help restore confidence that the state is present.

The NSA’s remarks show that Abuja increasingly views banditry as a governance challenge rather than only a battlefield problem. Territorial control and illegal taxation are especially serious because they represent direct competition with the authority of the state. When criminals decide who can farm, travel or trade and then collect money for permission, they are exercising powers ordinarily associated with government.

Restoring state authority therefore requires more than driving fighters out of forests. It requires ensuring that citizens see government institutions as the legitimate and effective source of protection, justice and public services. That is a much larger task than any single military operation.

Ribadu’s framework also places responsibility on local communities without suggesting that civilians should confront heavily armed groups themselves. Community participation in his model is primarily about trusted reporting, early warning and cooperation with professional security agencies. That distinction matters because poorly armed villagers cannot reasonably be expected to defend themselves against groups carrying military grade weapons.

The coming months will show whether the government can translate the strategy into measurable improvements. Sokoto remains under pressure, recent attacks demonstrate that armed groups retain operational capacity and local communities continue to report fear around farming and movement. At the same time, security agencies are carrying out raids, recovering weapons and strengthening deployments.

Ribadu’s own measure of progress may ultimately provide the clearest test. Fewer attacks are important, but they are not enough. Families must be able to return home. Farmers must be able to cultivate land without paying criminal levies. Children must be able to attend school. Markets and roads must operate normally. Communities must believe they can report threats without being abandoned or exposed.

That is the deeper meaning behind his warning that military operations alone cannot end banditry.

Nigeria may be able to defeat armed men in individual battles.

Ending the wider crisis will require rebuilding the authority, trust and economic life that banditry has destroyed.